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INTRODUCTION
Recently, a series of articles appeared in the July 1981 issue of Decision Sciences dealing with prospective trends in the study of organizational behavior (OB) in the 1980s (see the first five papers presented in that issue). One common strain of thought among the contributors was the need for &dquo;some bold experimentation in theory construction from conservatives and radicals alike&dquo;24 and the importance of increased reliance on the &dquo;construction, validation, and experimental use of simulation models&dquo; in OB research. 25 These are not new prescriptions; they were offered by members of the so-called systems modeling approach to organization study as early as the 1960s. Unfortunately, this school of thought has found little or no favor with &dquo;mainstream&dquo; organization theorists and many of those institutions and agencies funding research in this area. Thus, most management scientists and other systems advocates have turned elsewhere to more hospitable topics. This &dquo;new&dquo; attitude of organization behaviorists is encouraging, although this author has found little direct evidence of the change in his pursuit for the acceptance of and funding for such studies over the past few years. Nevertheless, having completed the important first phase of research along these lines, this paper is offered with others to follow. so The motivation for developing MANAGE came from the strong debate that has raged for years among economists, management scientists, organization theorists, and others as to whether firms seek as their basic objective to maximize profits and, if they do, whether this goal is realistically achievable. Unfortunately, there have been no means of resolving these issues. This is because (1) published data as to intentions and performance, unobstructed by the myriad influences on corporate actions, is unavailable and (2) the only available economic and management computer models that generate data to permit the joint study of corporate goals in a managerial context are mechanistic in nature. 2, 6, 17, 26, 27, 28, 29 Individuals in such models are most often represented as mathematical programs, each with an objective function to be optimized and each subjected to certain constraints. While probabilistic events may or may not be considered in the model, the objective is always to achieve some optimum goal through the coordination of subgoal achievements. Only passing, if any, attention is given to behavioral considerations and to the effect of communication difficulties. Consequently, while rich in results, these models are somewhat unrealistic in their representation of managerial communication and coordination. Therefore, the question of whether profit maximization (or other goal) results are achievable in a realistic communications environment remains u n resolved.
MANAGE seeks to overcome the limitations of these models while at the same time incorporating their desirable features.
MANAGE offers a framework whereby the achievement of the profit maximization goal of the firm can be studied more realistically within the context of hierarchical structure and certain relevant behavioral variables that affect intraorganizational communication. Thus, rather than being a form of computerized laboratory &dquo;game&dquo; created to teach participants how organizations should be developed, MANAGE offers a simulation laboratory, itself. It is designed to investigate the impact of hierarchical configurations on organizational performance prior to their actual implementation.
OVERVIEW OF THE MODEL
The basic format of MANAGE is that of a multi-echelon communication system similar to that outlined but not operationalized by Mesarovic, Macko, and Takahara.2o In addition, certain features discussed in Flamentl3 are incorporated. The firm, as conceived in the model, has a sequential production process governed by a hierarchical management structure similar to that illustrated in Figure 1 . The process specifies the technical input-output relationship. To ease computation, the firm is assumed to produce only one product and it is assumed to have one goal-profit maximization.
Because of the structure of the simulation routine, it has also been found more convenient to treat each element of the hierarchy as a decision unit rather than as an individual as have Mesarovic, Macko, and Takahara20 and Marschak and Radner.18 Sherman3l demonstrates that the viewpoint causes no loss of generality. From this perspective, the goal of the firm, i.e., profit maximization, is taken to be that of the highest ranking unit, the supremum (Figure 1 ). The prices of all inputs and the desired level output are determined exogenously as is the hierarchical configuration of the firm. The latter must be specified initially by the program user.
The role of the management structure, as in all firms in the real world, is to translate the objective of the supremal unit (acting in behalf of the firm) into actuality with resultant goods produced for society consumption. To accomplish this objective, the supremal decision unit sends orders to lower-level units in the hierarchy to instruct them as to what must be done. These orders are interpreted and verified through a process similar to that of negotiation, and the results are forwarded as orders to the next level in the structure, and so on. Eventually, instructions are received by the infimal decision units at the bottom of the hierarchy who directly control the production process of the firm. Based on the directives that reach them and their interpretation of these, they proceed to operate the manufacturing process and produce final outputs. The importance of the hierarchy lies in its influence upon the nature of the orders which the infimal units ultimately receive. If the structural arrangement of the component departments in the organization generates a great deal of distortion in those commands, the profit performance of the company will be much poorer than if the framework were to be one in which little or no distortion can take place. By examining various hierarchical configurations, it then becomes possible to observe the profit impact, and thus the impact on the performance of the firm, of each.
The system is portrayed as a budgeting-planning model rather than as an operating tool. This is because the operations of the firm are not considered in the model to be tailored to a time frame. However, the production decision itself is based on planning criteria and the necessary budgeting of corporate units that is consistent with such plans. The latter are constrained somewhat by time. The sacrifice has been made to reduce the added complexity that such recognition would require.
Model specifications and cost
MANAGE is a relatively small, but highly complex program containing 1,795 lines of code and comments and written in FOR-TRAN IV, H level language. The program is modular, consisting of a main program and 14 subroutines. It has been designed for batch processing on a Control Data Corporation, CDC Model 6600 computer. It requires a maximum memory allocation of 45,000 16-byte words. The model is adaptable to IBM or DEC mainframe systems and, with minor modifications, can be transformed for use in an interactive mode.
Each computer run costs between $30.00 and $50.00 at commercial university rates. Initial consulting assistance would be needed to familiarize the potential user with the model and its intricacies. However, the overall cost of putting up and using the program is unknown at this time. No benefit/cost studies have as yet been undertaken of the model, as it is still in advanced stages of testing and development. However, given its relatively low operating cost and the magnitude of the type of management problems whose resolution it has been designed to assist, the financial and operating benefits to be derived from MANAGE should be large in relation to the above-mentioned costs.
The methodology of the model MANAGE may be thought of as possessing four distinct components, although these are highly integrated in the program.
The first portion sets up the exogenous variables and background conditions (e.g., the hierarchy and sequential changes in the hierarchy) for the simulation runs, reads in all necessary data, performs error checks on the model, and writes out a copy of the input information. The second section of the model consists of the optimization algorithm which determines the optimal level of output to be produced and, from that infomation, the optimal amount of capital and labor to be used, maximum profits, and, based on these profits, the optimal budget for the firm. in addition, the procedure also determines the optimal budget for each subordinate decision unit. (The derivation of this algorithm is based on Sherman3~ and is similar to that found in Beckman4 and Musgrave and Rasche.23)
The third segment of MANAGE simulates the communication process which takes place between the decision units. By far the longest and most complicated portion of the program and the one containing the most subroutines, it adjusts for such features as multiple command, changing span of control, insertions of new levels into the hierarchy, changes in noise, and the effects of time pressure and capacity limits on decision unit performance. , The fourth section of the program contains the scheme for evaluating the performance of the firm and all the decision units within it. The performance of each is based on comparisons of actual (realized) profit with optimal returns, actual budget used versus the optimal budget, actual output in comparison with optimal production, output per unit of input, etc. In addition, comparisons of achievement levels are also made using quasi-optimal indicators for some elements of the decision structure. Quasi-optimal refers to performance of a decision unit based on information sent to it from other, non-supremal departments. It derives from the fact that these latter units, themselves, may have misinterpreted the optimal information sent to them before generating orders to be forwarded to the divisions under them. Thus, the program also assesses the performance of lower level units in terms of the orders sent to them, regardless of the accuracy of those orders. Appendix A provides a simplified flowchart of the procedures followed by MANAGE.
In order to run the program, certain information must be supplied by the user to initialize its exogenous parameters. Failure to supply any necessary data or incorrect specification of certain information will cause the program to abort immediately and a verbal description of the nature of the error which resulted in the abort will be produced. Some of the information which is required, particularly that which describes the individual characteristics of each decision unit, is subjective in nature. Therefore, as long as such data is provided, the simulation will be carried out. However, the quality of the results will be reflective of the care and skill of the user in realistically specifying appropriate parameters. A detailed, nine-page user's guide to MANAGE is available. It defines and describes each model parameter to be provided to the model. In addition, an example of the card layouts in the input deck is provided. The deck consists of one card (or line of input) for each decision unit specified to be in the firm's hierarchy, a header card, and an optional card to be inserted if certain span of control options are to be examined.
As indicated above, MANAGE permits the analysis of firms with hierarchies containing between three and five levels, not including the production process itself. Corporations which require a management structure, i.e., those which are large, can be expected to contain at least three tiers-an executive level (the supremal decision unit), a managerial level (the subordinate decision units), and an operating level (the infimal decision units). Although few major businesses possess more than seven levels, a number of studies by Carzo and Yanouzas,5 Filley and House, 12 Williamson,37 and others indicate that most have more finely divided authority distinctions than those permitted by only three gradations. Therefore, by permitting up to five levels in the structure portrayed by MANAGE, the effect of these layers of management and the concomitant impact of communication distance on organizational performance can be explored. Accordingly, the model permits the insertion of a level between the supremum and the subordinate decision units. The departments on this echelon are, therefore, intermediate-level subordinate decision units and are equivalent to the divisional executive levels in segmented or multi-product firms. The procedure also permits the insertion of a level be- There is a dichotomy of functions performed by units on different levels in the simulated firm. Those at or above the subordinate level are involved exclusively in the determination and communication of the final output requirements for the company and the associated budget needs of each sector. Those units below the subordinate tier are solely responsible for the communication of required capital input purchases (the intermediate-level infimal units) and for the fabrication of the components and final production of goods that use these components in the manufacturing process (the infimal units). Thus, the subordinate decision units are of particular importance in the configuration, since they are privy to certain budget and output information not passed on to lower levels and must convert such data into capital input purchase orders for those serving under them. They provide the link between the upper and lower echelons in the firm. The supremal unit is the only sector of the business which possesses knowledge of the desired profit level. It is its task to develop the overall budget limits for the firm. Budget requests by underling divisions are then reviewed in light of this limitation. The supremal unit also makes exclusive determination as to the number of people to be hired in each division of the company.
The maximum number of decision units that may comprise any given level of the hierarchy, excepting the first (highest) eche-Ion, is 12. There may be only one supremal decision unit. The 12 unit limit is based on a number of studies of the maximal number of subordinates that can be effectively controlled by any given unit. 5, 7, 12, 38 Optional features An optional feature of the program permits evaluation of the effects of sequential changes in the span of control of a specified higher-level decision unit on the performance of the firm, the lower-ranking units under it, and of the senior unit itself. The procedure is designed to increase gradually the span of control of a selected superior department from one unit up to a total of eight units through the re-assignment of subordinate divisions. To allow the fullest investigation of this effect, the program will perform a step-wise evaluation of span sizes for departments on any of the intermediate levels of the hierarchy. The supremal unit also does not possess this feature. Changes in its span of control can only occur by adding new units to the structure, and not through internal reorganization. The addition of subordinate units would change the optimal solution results for the firm with each inclusion of a new unit. This alteration would cause evaluations of performance under alternative authority configurations to be noncomparable. On the other hand, sequential changes in span of control can be accomplished on the other three (intermediate) levels without altering the total number of units on any tier. For the latter gradations, the optimal solution, against which performance comparisons are to be made, remains unchanged throughout the analysis. Therefore, the effects of gradual changes in span of control can be assessed consistently. It should also be noted that infimal units are excluded since they control no divisions. Another optional feature of MANAGE allows the user to examine the impact of multiple command structures on the performance of the firm and its components. This procedure can only be implemented if a level of intermediate subordinate decision units has been inserted into the hierarchy. Further, joint authority is permitted only over the subordinate level decision units. These constraints are necessary because of the dichotomy of budget versus output communication that exists between different hierarchical levels. This situation makes it impossible for decision units in the top half of the organization to communicate directly with those in the bottom half, since the latter are not privy to budget information and related orders. Both the supremal unit and one or more intermediate-level subordinate departments may exercise simultaneous authority over a common subordinate division (Figures 4a and 4b ). However, as illustrated in Figure 5 , no more than four senior sectors-three intermediate-level groups and the supremummay direct a common unit at one time. The three intermediate authorities must be positioned above and immediately to the left, center, or right of the jointly directed unit. An algorithm has been developed as a part of MANAGE to provide a consistent means of enabling the subordinate decision unit to &dquo;decide&dquo; upon which superior group it will accept orders from. The procedure, though somewhat complicated, is based on the average historical penalty that that unit has suffered by having chosen to adhere to orders sent from a particular commanding sector. The penalty is derived from an assessment of the accuracy of the budget information forwarded to the unit over time from each senior authority group. A higher penalty is imposed for underbudgeting than for overbudgeting. This is because acceptance of too low a budget ensures deficient performance by the subordinate unit and its underlings.
Finally, the program possesses one additional elective. Each of the subordinate and intermediate-level subordinate decision units may play strategies in negotiating their assigned budgets. This feature allows these departments to be risk-takers, riskaverters, or risk neutral. In the first case, such a division would request budgets below what it feels is necessary to elicit optimal performance and, upon receipt of an allotment, would attempt to reach this ultimate goal. In the second instance, it would seek a larger budget than necessary to ensure its achievement. If risk-neutral, the component would solicit financial capital strictly in accordance with its anticipated need. The latter alternative is the only one of the three examined by the author. 31 Learning, anxiety, noise, and other features of MANAGE In addition to the above options, MANAGE also contains several built-in routines which add to the realism of the model. First, MANAGE allows decision units on all levels to &dquo;learn&dquo; as negotiations are carried forth. Over a period of time, senior departments gain a clearer &dquo;understanding&dquo; of the performance reports sent to them by sectors. Similarly, the comprehension of orders by junior divisions also grows as they increasingly interact with superior units.
The program incorporates the learning feature through an adaptation of procedures found in Thomopoulos and Lehman35 and Baum and Bohlen.3 According to these authors, the learning function assumes the form: f(n) -an where: f(n) = the rate of learning, i.e., the learning curve, which measures performance on the nth repetition of an assignment a = the initial level of performance n = the cumulative number of repetitions of the assignment = the exponent of the learning function which reflects the rate of learning The learning function in MANAGE refers to the cumulative understanding acquired by a decision unit as it receives repetitive communication of information or orders. The variable a is interpreted in the program to be the initial level of noise assigned in a particular simulation run and n is the number of passes (communications) of the same information or orders between any two units. The parameter 9 is as defined and is built into MANAGE. MANAGE evaluates both corporate and individual unit performance in each simulation substudy for three alternative levels of noise, unless the user chooses either to restrict these selections or to examine performance in a noiseless context. Thus, there are normally at least three sets of runs in every substudy.
The alternative noise levels are 5%, 15%, and 45% distortion of the contents of the communications. Each alternative is specified in the model as the probabilistic degree of variation over ± 3a (standard deviations) of the desired (i.e., mean) communication, based on a normal curve.
The approach centers around the use of a random number generator that draws values from a normal probability distribution. Thus, to &dquo;create&dquo; a level of noise, the methodology requires that the mean and standard deviation of the distribution be specified. The mean value represents the intended communication, while the standard deviation reflects the standardized degree of variation in that message that can be expected to occur slightly over 68% of the time for 10/ and 99.7% of the time for 3o.
To clarify this procedure in more detail, suppose that an order is sent from a senior division to a junior one requesting the latter to produce an output of, for example, 100,000 units. Further, let us assume that the noise level to be simulated is 5%.
The noise generation technique within MANAGE will then require that the mean value of 100,000 units and the standard deviated value of 833.33 units be fed in to begin the process ± 1a of 100,000 is 1,667 units. The command that the junior division will actually receive when noise is thus allowed to impact on the communication, given the stipulation of a 5% level of noise of f 3o standard deviations, will then vary between 97,500 and 102,500 units 997 times out of a thousand! (Since distortion can occur both in transmission and reception, the actual order will vary by the compound influence of noise on both ends of the communication.) The effect of learning is to reduce this degree of distortion over time.
The basis for the selection of the 5% noise level is to be found in the works of Williamson37 and Monsen and Downs,22 particularly the former. Williamson found that compliance typically will not reach 100% and is most likely to be around 90%. Furthermore, Williamson concluded, as have Carzo and Yanouzas5 and others, that the failure to comply is fundamentally responsible for limitations to firm size. Monsen and Downs offer discussion to support a maximum compliance value of 95%.
At the other extreme, both Tullock36 and Downs8 have explored the performance impact on an institution of having a compliance factor as low as 50%. They found that in a seventiered organization, the last recipient of a communication will receive only 1.6% of the intended meaning (6.3% in a fivelevel entity). This assumes that no measures are taken at any point in the transmission to reduce distortion. These boundaries, i.e., 5% and 50% distortion, provided the practical basis for establishing the range of alternative noise levels.
The parameter n, i.e., the number of communication passes of a specified message between any two decision units in any run, is automatically incremented as negotiations are carried out. Its value is limited by a complicated procedure which governs the negotiation process on a decision unit-by-decision unit basis. Briefly, the next round of correspondence by a unit is permitted only (1) if it possesses sufficient unused and unassigned capacity to send, receive, and interpret the next communication from its interacting partner, (2) to carry out its assigned duties, and (3) to allow sufficient communication of future orders and information between itself and all of its remaining adjunct departments. If sufficient uncommitted capaci-ty no longer remains for either the partner or itself, negotiations are terminated and final data are sent to the subordinate decision unit. Obviously, all learning derived from communication between the two partners ends at that point for that particular simulation run.
The final parameter in the learning function, i.e., the exponent 9 that reflects the learning rate, has been built into MANAGE at a fixed level. The value that was chosen has been based on several considerations, the most important of which are the results of past research findings and considerations of the impact of the learning process on computer run time. Unfortunately, there has been only limited research into the typical or most appropriate value(s) which 9 should be expected to assume. In general, investigators have found that 9 falls in the range 0.0 > f3 ~ 0.7.3/35 The choice in these investigations as well as this one has been dependent upon the mathematical formulation for the learning curve that was adopted, the focus of the study (i.e., aggregate comprehension at the firm or industry level versus individual and group understanding of an assignment or communication), and/or the values selected for other parameters in the equation. A number of alternative values of 9 were explored during the model validation process based on the results of several studies of learning, including those cited above. The figure which seemed to produce the most reasonable results, given the nature of the model formulation, was 0.1. This value is consistent with the findings of these learning studies, produces learning curves that lie within the families of such curves produced in all of the studies examined, and permits completion of all simulation runs within reasonable limitations on computer processing time.
At the same time that learning takes place, decision units exhaust their capacity to perform. The need to carry out communication and other organizational responsibilities gradually overloads the unit as available time and capacity are increasingly imposed upon. It is this imposition which has led many theorists to the fundamental conclusion that there is an increasing need for hierarchy as organizations grow (examples include Downs8 and Tullock36). In fact, in nearly every study of organization, there is either an explicit or an implicit assumption of increased transmission error arising because of the effects of capacity overload (see, for example, Huber,15 Arrow/1 and Monsen and Downs22). Unfortunately, little work has been done towards the quantification of the impact of this phenomenon on performance. However, efforts by Drenick and Levis,9 Marschak and Radner,18 and Kleinman16 offer very general relationships. Without previous guidance, but requiring such a formula (or procedure) in the model to enable it to reflect realistically such occurrences, the author queried several industrial psychologists, sociologists, and management consultants regarding the nature and effect of this process. Two important considerations become evident from the discussions. First, a suitable means for measuring capacity was required. Second, the functional form necessary to relate capacity and performance had to reflect three stages of impact-(1) early, when little, if any, distortion would appear, (2) intermediate, when distortion would be growing simultaneously with reduced capacity, and (3) final, when all capacity would be used up and distortion would be complete, i.e., no communication would take place in the vicinity of the decision unit. The first problem was particularly difficult to surmount since it requires that the capacity measure jointly represent both available time and ability. On the strength of further discussion, the functional form problem was overcome by adopting a functional relationship which permits distortion-free communication until a decision unit has used up 75% of its capacity.31 Thereafter, the level of anxietyinduced noise increases monotonically up to its maximum (45% error between -3a and +3a of the desired (i.e., mean) quantitative information (information or order being communicated) as unused and uncommitted capacity fall to zero. &dquo;Anxiety&dquo; is mitigated to some extent by another automatic feature of MANAGE, the generation and transmission of Type I orders as replacements for Type II commands. Type I orders are general commands that may be sent simultaneously to several subordinates. On the other hand, Type II orders are very specific in nature and can be communicated only on a one-to-one basis between a unit and its underlings. Type I orders, therefore, serve the important function of enabling a superior group to maintain the flow of commands as capacity nears exhaustion. The penalty for this substitution is reduced compliance by subordinates because of the higher noise and lack of specificity of such directives.
The program incorporates this feature, i.e., order substitution, through a set of formulations appearing as a subroutine.31 The procedure also permits similar substitutions to be made among the performance reports sent back from subordinate to superior units. Again, since there is no literature support for the specific formulation of the procedure or for the parameter values selected, the subroutine has been constructed on the basis of the author's interpretation of discussions held with experts in the fields noted above.
The subroutine has been designed so that no Type I orders (or performance reports) are generated by a unit until at least 75% of its uncommitted capacity has been exhausted. This corresponds to the anxiety-induced error threshold just discussed. Thus, from the viewpoint of MANAGE, as a unit begins to &dquo;feel&dquo; the pressure of time, it seeks to conserve its capacity by sending briefer, more general, but also more ambiguous communiques. As time shortens, the relative frequency of such transmissions increases, thereby compounding the effects of distortion. However, this trade-off of message-types stretches out the remaining period over which the decision unit can continue to communicate with its adjunct division. As noted earlier, a complicated set of decision rules located at appropriate points throughout MANAGE constantly updates used capacity and evaluates the uncommitted portion to enable each unit to determine when negotiations between that department and any other are to be terminated.
The optimization algorithm
Of all the components of MANAGE, the optimization algorithm is perhaps the most essential. It is this procedure which, based on the initial parameter values supplied by the program user, determines the maximizing criteria against which the actual performance of the firm is measured.
The algorithm is predicated on the classical economic assumption that the goal of any firm is to maximize its profits. Furthermore, it has been designed to reflect the fact that this goal is constrained by the nature of the firm's production process, as specified by its production function. The latter expresses the input requirements necessary to achieve the profit maximizing, or any other, level of output in terms of the manufacturing techniques employed by the company. In addition, the procedure satisfies certain economic conditions that ensure that profits are in fact optimized.4,21,23,31 The specific form of the profit function used in the algorithm is fully determined by the revenue and cost functions for the firm. The former is simply the product of price and output since revenue is assumed to be market-determined. Thus, the firm is viewed as being purely competitive. The latter function is derived by solving simultaneously the Lagrangian formed from the input cost and production functions and the equations specifying the economic conditions for minimum production costs, i.e., that the ratio of the marginal physical products of any two inputs be equal to the ratio of their prices (see Ferguson,» for more detailed discussion). The production function that has been chosen for the firm was developed by the author and shall be referred to as the Modified Cobb-Douglas (MC-D) form. As pointed out by Shephard3° and Stephens,33 the popular Cobb-Douglas (C-D) equation, as well as certain other varieties of economic production functions, suffer from the shortcoming that they do not yield U-shaped cost curves necessary for the determination of the point of optimum profit, except under very rigid and unrealistic assumptions. The alternatives to the Cobb-Douglas formula are mathematically complicated. Furthermore, when conditions are imposed on the C-D form to yield the necessary cost function, it, too, becomes somewhat untractable. The Modified Cobb-Douglas production function, of which the C-D equation is a special case, produces a U-shaped cost curve, requires no limiting assumptions, and is mathematically less complex. Furthermore, this functional form satisfies the condition that minimum costs be yielded independently of assumptions regarding factor prices, market structure, and scale efficiencies.1o,3o
It may be argued that the use of an economic production function, particularly one of the Cobb-Douglas form, is somewhat unrealistic and that one based on engineering criteria would be more appropriate for an analysis such as this. However, a number of authors have offered arguments supporting the suitability and representativeness of economic functions vis-avis those based more on technological considerations in evaluating overall firm behavior, at least for certain types of processes or for aggregate corporate behavior. 19, 32 In general, l, it is argued that with engineering functions neither entrepreneurial inputs nor non-technical (staff) operations, such as marketing and finance, are explicitly represented. Thus, these relations reflect only individual process or plant operations. Furthermore, these authors have found that many technical processes can be adequately described by economic functions. None of these arguments precludes the use of engineering production functions. In fact, as shall be pointed out later, such process representations may be more appropriate in the simulation model employed herein, than in other types of economic studies. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon the investigator using such functions to modify them to overcome the limitations discussed above. The Modified Cobb-Douglas function used in the algorithm to represent the overall production relationship for the firm is of the form: where q = the number of units of final output produced A = the technical (input-output) coefficient Xi = the number of units of the ith input used in the production process ai = the unadjusted elasticity of production with respect to the ith input As demonstrated in Sherman,31 this function provides one of the bases for the determination of the total cost function for the firm. In addition, it is also used in the evaluation scheme to derive the actual output produced from the factor inputs purchased.
The algorithm, itself, provides a unique optimal solution to the profit equation formed from the firm's revenue and cost formulas, i.e., the one which maximizes its returns. The profit function has the form: where P = the market price of the final output produced ri = the wage rate of the ith input and and the remaining variables are as previously defined.
In order to locate the point of optimum earnings, the profit equation must be differentiated with respect to q and the result set equal to zero (the familiar marginal conditions of microeconomic theory). This produces a transcendental equation of nonlinear form which cannot be solved directly. The optimization algorithm uses search techniques based on Newton's iteration methodla,3a to locate extremely accurate approximations with high efficiency. The algorithm produces the following information:
(1) The optimal level of output, q.
(2) The optimal level of profit, n, for the firm.
(3) The optimal budget for the firm (which is derived from the company's total cost function under optimal output conditions).
(4) The optimal number of units of labor in each decision unit.
(5) The optimal labor budget for the firm. (6) The optimal number of units of each &dquo;type&dquo; of capital input. (7) The optimal capital input budget for each subordinatelevel decision unit.
The solution developed by the algorithm is completely dependent on the parameter values provided to the program by the user. However, these information requirements are relatively small. The investigator need only supply data for the unadjusted production elasticities, a~, for each of the inputs, both capital and labor; the wage rate for each of these factors of production, rj; and the market price of the final output produced, P.
The problem lies in the determination of these, especially the a-s, since the literature provides little guidance in this area. The problem is compounded by the need for consistency among the parameters (as well as that for the capacity variable), the need for realism in the model, and the technical considerations inherent in MANAGE which limit one's choices if consistency and realism are to be maintained.31
All the remaining variables in the production, cost, and profit equations, excepting the input-output coefficient, A, are determined endogenously. The model assigns a value of unity to A, both for simplicity and realism. It should be noted that relatively little attention has been paid to this parameter in the literature. However, this assumption is not inconsistent with the data that is infrequently cited. 19, 32 MODEL VALIDATION Very elaborate validation procedures have been established to examine and ensure the proper functioning and representativeness of MANAGE. The process has been particularly difficult since many aspects of the model and many of its parameters have either never been studied, never been studied in any systematic or general way, or have received only very limited research attention. Thus, the author could only rely upon comparisons of MANAGE's performance against actual results in a limited number of specific companies and other organizations in conjunction with outcomes hypothesized or examined initially in the several studies cited in this paper. In those areas where no research or other findings are availablefor example, with respect to individual communication capacity, the rate of communication anxiety-frustration build-ups, and their productivity rates-the author had to rely on internal consistency within the model and discussions with several consultant experts and company management specialists to validate these aspects of the model. The author utilized this information heedfully and with the permission and careful disclosure protection of its providers.
With these limitations in mind, several steps were taken in validating each aspect of the model. Because of their complexity and the space limitations of this paper, the reader is directed to Sherman3~ for most of the details. Briefly, each aspect of the model was examined under a predetermined array of alternative hierarchical configurations, first under perfect information (i.e., no noise) and then with increased predetermined levels of noise.
This approach was particularly useful in examining the functioning of the budgeting and optimization algorithms. These functions and the factor inputs, production outputs, costs, and prices used in them were evaluated against the actual performance of several small, medium, and large-sized fabrication companies studied by the author. Hierarchical configurations used in the model at this time were chosen to reflect those in the comparison companies. Noise levels and hierarchical complexity were then increased carefully in steps to examine the model's performance in comparison with research results obtained for similar organizational phenomena and noise levels.5,8,37
The sensitivity of MANAGE to variations in economic and behavioral parameter inputs was then tested. This validation phase was particularly difficult since there are no guidelines as to relationships between these parameters. Therefore, the author could only evaluate the model's performance in comparison with the approximate experience of several institutions. Thus, results produced by the model under a wide variety of conditions similar to those experienced in several government agencies and companies, both large and small, were compared against the actual performance of those entities. Hypothesis testing of the means and standard deviations of the comparative results was conducted to determine the model's sensitivity and realism. Results produced by MANAGE were found to be comparable to those of the test institutions at the 10% level of confidence or better. 31 Finally, a limited pretrial of the maximum ranges of parameter sets was carried out to examine the reasonableness of the program outputs and to ensure that the model outputs did not blow up. No major problems have as yet been encountered. However, as a result of the findings obtained in the validation process and during several applications of the model (to be discussed briefly in the next section), the author contemplates several changes in the model in the future to enhance both the model's flexibility and that of the user. These would (1) allow the user to select learning rates and noise levels associated with each particular decision unit, (2) allow a wider range of communication within the model, and (3) provide more flexible budgeting and production algorithms.
USE OF TH E MODE L: AN EXAMPLE, RESULTS,
AND DISCUSSION
Since its development MANAGE's use has been largely devoted to an examination of a number of structural and behavioral hypotheses proposed or reiterated in the literature of organization theory. 5, 6, 8, 15, 22, 37 Appendix B provides an excerpt from an example of the output produced by MANAGE for one such study. This particular study involved tests of the effects on organization performance as the span of control of the supremal decision unit is increased. Because of the large volume of output produced by the program, only the first few pages are reproduced. These illustrate the input data, the optimal solution under perfect information, and an example of the final results under an initial noise level of 5% for several of the infimal and the supremal decision units. All wage data is weekly, the output values are in thousands, and the decision unit capacities represent the maximum number of tasks per week (i.e., performance reports generated and transmitted; orders generated, interpreted, and received; and actions taken) that each decision unit can carry out.
The model has been used to examine 24 hypotheses and corollary hypotheses dealing with the effects of multiple command, span of control, differences in command authority, levels of noise, learning, distance, and other structural and behavioral phenomena on organization performance. These will be reported subsequently in a paper now under preparation by the author.
Analysis of variance techniques has been used to examine the results of a large number of simulation runs on each structural configuration and its interaction with other behavioral variables on organization performance. The strongest statistical results (i.e., those significant at the 1 % level), have been obtained for the individual effects of span of control, distance, decision unit capacity, organizational size in terms of the number of decision units, and noise. The results obtained for the joint effect of each structural parameter and the noise level on performance were mixed. This indicates that some structures are better at mitigating the effects of noise than are others. Briefly, the results indicate that the optimal span of control of a decision unit is not unique, but is highly dependent on the hierarchical level on which the unit resides. While both capacity and noise are significant determinants of performance, both are overshadowed by the centrality of each unit. The more superiors exercising joint control over it and the more subordinate units over which it exercises control, the poorer the performance of that unit.
A large number of results have been obtained with the model to date. However, these are too extensive to be reported herein and are tangential to the immediate purpose of this paper, i.e., to provide the reader with a general overview of MANAGE.
CURRENT AND POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL MANAGE offers a medium for examining a wide variety of issues concerning managerial communication, coordination, and effectiveness. It has already been used to explore the validity of various theoretical propositions regarding the effect of hierarchical structure on organizational functioning and to examine goal achievement in large bureaucratic institutions.31 MANAGE offers a potentially useful vehicle to assist organization planners in designing new or reorganizing existing management structures to improve organizational effectiveness and performance. It also offers a means of evaluating current or potential key control and reporting locations within an organization's management structure. MANAGE could also be of substantial use as a means of exploring the structural impact of mergers and acquisitions. Another important potential contribution of MANAGE would be as a vehicle for exploring the reasons why identical or closely resembling management structures work well in one division of an organization, but poorly in another.
By focusing on the interaction of people, structure, and organizational functions, MANAGE offers a previously unavailable means of testing in a more realistic laboratory-like setting the pragmatic impact and influence of different hierarchical structures on organizational functioning and performance. Further extensions and refinements in MANAGE are contemplated (as noted earlier), and the author intends to pursue these to the extent that enabling grants and other sources of funds become available. However, MANAGE has already proven to be of use to the firms and agencies with whom the author has already worked or from whom he has sought assistance. In particular, it has strongly influenced their thinking and attitude respecting the impact of organizational interactions and restructuring on performance. In the future, it is hoped that the suggested need for more attention to simulation modeling and organizational interactions and restructuring on performance. In the future, it is hoped that the suggested need for more attention to simulation modeling and organizational systems design discussed in the July 1981 issue of Decision Sciences will produce much greater support for the development, testing, and application of models such as MANAGE. It is with this hope that this paper and others to follow are offered.
